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This is a book, both comprehensive and
thought-provoking, with a timely thesis
that is a “must read” for anyone inter-
ested in human behavior and our collective
future. Matthew Blakeway takes the view
that our brains are biological computers
with algorithms for action. But what if the
algorithms are based on faulty data? What
if our actions, based on our beliefs, are a
product of causal circularity?
Blakeway reminds us that we can-
not directly observe people’s emotions
and beliefs. They must be induced from
behavior–what we say and do. He contends
that humans are biologically driven to cre-
ate environments that enhance our sur-
vival by creating favorable emotional out-
comes, and avoiding those that are less
advantageous. Emotions are the drivers
of our actions, but he proposes that
they can become corrupted through tac-
tical deception. This corruption happens
when we logically derive our understand-
ing of emotions from the affected or
suppressed behavior of others (or our-
selves). We deduce an incorrect under-
standing because the input is invalid. This
results in false beliefs of which we are
unaware, but they affect our own behav-
ior. Language allows us to think and re-
visit our emotional responses, anchoring
them further in memory. Our thoughts
and beliefs become irrefutable logical tau-
tologies. This results in actions for our-
selves and our societies that are no longer
fitness-enhancing, but are self-destructive.
Blakeway makes an important distinc-
tion between statements of “believing in”
and “believing that.” The latter can be
subjected to scientific scrutiny and exper-
imentation, but the former cannot, as
a belief in is irrefutable. Presumed true
because they cannot be falsified, having
beliefs inmakes human conflict inevitable.
History is replete with examples of incom-
patible belief systems that drive conflict
and war, the latest being the mass dis-
placement and slaughter of thousands
of people in Iraq by the Islamic State.
Furthermore, the actual words that are
used to talk about ideological concepts,
like “democracy” or “capitalism,” encap-
sulate compound beliefs. The more accu-
mulated concepts that your understanding
of the ideological term has acquired, the
more prone you (and others) are to “belief
drift” and conceptual thought-fluff.
Making this belief distinction also
explains why it is so difficult to change
strongly held views with the presentation
of scientific evidence that contradicts
them. Blakeway argues that ideology
always takes precedence over empirical
evidence because ideology is a trap based
upon a causal circularity that leads to a
tautological understanding; it is simply
and unquestionably considered true from
the perspective of its believers. Its own
truth is created through a belief feedback
loop—an inherent “wheel of doom.”
Ideologies can be hoodwinked by cir-
cumventing their original intent. For
example, the pursuit of arbitrage by cap-
italists was of benefit to society, but now
leads to both a reallocation, and at the
same time, a diminution of wealth through
the use of hedge funds, and other eco-
nomic manipulations. In other circum-
stances, rather than acknowledge that a
belief is untenable and even destructive
to our wellbeing as seen by accumulating
evidence, a tipping point is reached and
we quite rationally impute that it is we
who failed the belief, and the belief itself
remains intact. These failed beliefs can
turn into “purer” and more extreme forms
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of the same belief. At a societal level, this
leads to the spiraling pursuit of ideological
fundamentalism that has a logical contra-
diction at its core. Blakeway provides good
examples of this with regard to the cur-
rent surge of both political and religious
fundamentalism in the world today.
The description of the process by
which our emotions become distorted is
plausible. It hinges on evolutionary the-
ory and socialization. Although Blakeway
doesn’t mention human development to
any large degree, the evidence (for a
review, Astington, 1994) does support his
view. From the beginning babies pre-
fer social to nonsocial stimuli, and by
5 months they are able to distinguish
different expressions of emotion. Social
interaction is the meeting of minds, and
by 2 years, children understand and talk
about their mental states, including beliefs,
desires, and intentions. A year later they
take on the minds of others in their pre-
tend play, and by 4 years, children can
recognize, and create false beliefs in oth-
ers through deliberate acts of deception.
Similarly, as early as the first few months,
there is social pressure to suppress nega-
tive emotion, and “emotional masks” are
evident in 3-year-olds (Kieras et al., 2005).
We are hard wired through evolution for
understanding (and manipulating) others’
minds, and suppressing our emotions.
Blakeway moves the evolutionary argu-
ment one step further. Anger and revenge
as a response to humiliation has an evo-
lutionary basis with regard to parental
investment and sexual selection. The
revenge response maximizes male bio-
logical fitness by removing threats to
gene transmission. He contends that if
acts of humiliation, by individuals or
the state, are met with denial and the
suppression of revenge, then the anger
that follows these acts becomes misdi-
rected, violent, and targetless. The cause
of the destruction is mythologized because
we are oblivious to its real source, and
revenge escalates in often, unpredictable
ways. Ideas of “brain washing,” and “rad-
icalization” are given new explanations,
raising the possibility of more effective
interventions.
The epilog is entitled “Science and
Philosophy Reunite.” The method is
a series of thought experiments, and
Blakeway’s contribution is a new theory of
how a human algorithm works to produce
behavior. He presents a cohesive argument
about the necessity to understand and
become aware of our thought traps, and
move beyond them to create a world where
all can live, without humiliation, anger and
violence. Our moral emotions (e.g., pity,
sympathy) are also a product of evolution
by natural selection, and there is a need
to avoid their corruption or suppression,
which may become habitual, and as such,
contribute to ideological belief-action
tautologies. In Darwin’s theory, there is
only evolutionary press to survive, and as
self-referencing biological machines, it is
suggested that meaning and purpose in
life may best be found by changing our
behavior to enhance our emotional out-
comes and avoid self-destructive logical
actions.
REFERENCES
Astington, J. W. (1994). The Child’s Discovery of the
Mind. London: Hammersmith.
Kieras, J. E., Tobin, R. M., Graziano, W. G., and
Rothbart, M. K. (2005). You can’t always get
what you want: effortful control and children’s
responses to undesirable gifts. Psychol. Sci. 16,
391–396. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01546.x
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares
that the research was conducted in the absence
of any commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential conflict of
interest.
Received: 27 August 2014; accepted: 10 October 2014;
published online: 07 November 2014.
Citation: Fletcher-Flinn CM (2014) Beliefs, self-
destruction, and the rational mind. Front. Psychol.
5:1231. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01231
This article was submitted to Cognitive Science, a section
of the journal Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Fletcher-Flinn. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permit-
ted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are
credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted aca-
demic practice. No use, distribution or reproduc-
tion is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science November 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1231 | 2
